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Abstract
Coronavirus COVID-19 spreads through the population mostly based on social contact. To gauge
the potential for widespread contagion, to cope with associated uncertainty and to inform its mitigation,
more accurate and robust modelling is centrally important for policy making.
We provide a flexible modelling approach that increases the accuracy with which insights can be made.
We use this to analyse different scenarios relevant to the COVID-19 situation in the UK. We present
a stochastic model that captures the inherently probabilistic nature of contagion between population
members. The computational nature of our model means that spatial constraints (e.g., communities and
regions), the susceptibility of different age groups and other factors such as medical pre-histories can be
incorporated with ease. We analyse different possible scenarios of the COVID-19 situation in the UK.
Our model is robust to small changes in the parameters and is flexible in being able to deal with different
scenarios.
This approach goes beyond the convention of representing the spread of an epidemic through a fixed
cycle of susceptibility, infection and recovery (SIR). It is important to emphasise that standard SIR-type
models, unlike our model, are not flexible enough and are also not stochastic and hence should be used
with extreme caution. Our model allows both heterogeneity and inherent uncertainty to be incorporated.
Due to the scarcity of verified data, we draw insights by calibrating our model using parameters from
other relevant sources, including agreement on average (mean field) with parameters in SIR-based models.
We use the model to assess parameter sensitivity for a number of key variables that characterise the
COVID-19 epidemic. We also test several control parameters with respect to their influence on the severity
of the outbreak. Our analysis shows that due to inclusion of spatial heterogeneity in the population and
the asynchronous timing of the epidemic across different areas, the severity of the epidemic might be
lower than expected from other models.
We find that one of the most crucial control parameters that may significantly reduce the severity
of the epidemic is the degree of separation of vulnerable people and people aged 70 years and over, but
note also that isolation of other groups has an effect on the severity of the epidemic. It is important
to remember that models are there to advise and not to replace reality, and that any action should be
coordinated and approved by public health experts with experience in dealing with epidemics.
The computational approach makes it possible for further extensive scenario-based analysis to be
undertaken. This and a comprehensive study of sensitivity of the model to different parameters defining
COVID-19 and its development will be the subject of our forthcoming paper. In that paper, we shall also
extend the model where we will consider different probabilistic scenarios for infected people with mild
and severe cases.
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1 Introduction
We model the development of the COVID-19 epidemic in the UK under different scenarios of handling
the epidemic. There are many standard epidemiological models for modelling epidemics, see e.g. [1, 2].
In this research, we use a more generic simulation model which has the following features:
• it can take into account spatial heterogeneity of the population and heterogeneity of development
of epidemic in different areas;
• it allows the use of time-dependent strategies for analysing the epidemics;
• it allows taking into account special characteristics of particular groups of people, especially people
with specific medical pre-histories and elderly.
Standard epidemiological models such as SIR and many of its modifications do not possess these
properties and hence are not applicable for any study that requires the use of the features above. In
particular, In particular, for influenza the mortality changes less significantly with age in comparison
to coronavirus; hence common influenza models do not give much insight in modelling the COVID-19
epidemic. The report [3], which is widely considered as the main document specifying the current epidemic
in the UK and in the world, is almost entirely based on the use of standard epidemiological models and
hence the conclusions of [3] seem to be lacking specifics related to important issues of the study such as
heterogeneity of development of epidemic at different locations and even flexible use of different death
rates across different ages. Unreliability of COVID-19 data, including the numbers of COVID cases and
COVID deaths, is a serious problem. It is discussed, in particular, by G. Antes, in [4].
Despite the SIR models including the model of [3] have been heavily criticised [5], when choosing the
main parameters of our model we calibrate it so that its mean field version approximately reproduces the
same output as SIR-based models of [3, 6] and we use the parameter values consistent with [3, 6]. Also,
the main notation (which sometimes does not look natural from a statistician’s point of view) is taken
from [6].
The primary objective of our work is construction of a reliable, robust and interpretable model de-
scribing the epidemic under different control regimes. In this paper, we make the first step towards this
objective. Due to lack of time and unreliability of available data on COVID-19, most of our results serve
as an illustration of the role of different control options and we hope that even as illustration they are
useful. However, we try to stay close to the COVID-19 epidemic scenario and hence we use appropriate
recommendations about the choice of parameters and models of the virus behaviour we found from the
studies based on the use of standard models.
See conclusions in Sections 3,4,5 for the main conclusions of this work.
Acknowledgement. We are grateful to several colleagues in Univ. Cambridge and Univ. Warwick for
useful comments on drafts of this paper and to M. Hairer (ICL) and J. Ball (Univ. Nottingham) for
valuable comments and discussions.
2 The model
Variables and parameters
• t - time (in days)
• t0 - intervention time (e.g., the time when self-isolation starts)
• N - population size
• I(t) - number of infected at time t
• R(t) - number of immune (recovered or dead) at time t (this makes full sense from a modelling
perspective, but we appreciate that this may look kind of strange when read by non-scientists)
• S(t) = N − I(t)−R(t) - number of susceptible at time t
• M - number of groups selected for the study
• Nm - size of m-th group (N = N1 +N2 + . . .+NM )
• Im(t) - number of infected at time t in group m
• Rm(t) - number of immune at time t in group m
• Sm(t) - number of susceptible at time t in group m
• β - average number of transmissions of the virus per unit of time with no intervention
• 1/σ - average infectious period
• k - shape parameter of the Erlang distribution
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• R0 = β/σ - reproductive number (average number of people who will capture the disease from one
contagious person)
• R′0 - reproductive number after intervention
• pm - probability to recover for an infected person from the m-th group
Values of parameters and generic model
The reproductive number R0 is the main parameter defining the speed of development of an epidemic.
There is no true value for R0 as it varies in different parts of the UK (and the world). In particular, in
rural areas one would expect a considerably lower value of R0 than in London. Authors of [3] suggest
R0 = 2.2 and R0 = 2.4 as typical; the authors of [6] use values for R0 in the range [2.25, 2.75]. We
shall use the value R0 = 2.5 as typical which may be a slightly pessimistic choice overall but could be an
adequate choice for the mega-cities where the epidemics develop faster and may lead to more causalities.
In rural areas, in small towns, and everywhere else where social contacts are less intense, the epidemic is
milder.
We assume that the person becomes infected τ days after catching the virus, where τ has Poisson
distribution with mean of 1 week. To model the time to recover (or die) we use Erlang distribution with
shape parameter k = 3 and rate parameter λ = 1/7 so that the mean of the distribution is k/λ = 1/σ = 21
(in simulations, we discretise the numbers to their nearest integers). This implies that we assume that
the average longevity of the period of time while the infected person is contagious is 21 days, in line
with the current knowledge, see e.g. [7, 8, 9]. Standard deviation of the chosen Erlang distribution is
approximately 12, which is rather large and reflects the uncertainty we currently have about the period of
time a person needs to recover (or die) from COVID-19. An increase in 1/σ would prolong the epidemic
and smaller values of 1/σ would make it to cause people to be contagious for less time. The use of Erlang
distribution is standard for modelling similar events in reliability and queuing theories, which have much
in common with epidemiology. We have considered the sensitivity of the model in this study with respect
to the choice of parameters λ and σ but more has to be done in cooperation with epidemiologists. As
there are currently many outbreaks epidemics, new knowledge about the distribution of the period of
infection by COVID-19 can emerge soon.
The model varies depending on purposes of the study. The main ingredients are: Im(t) is the birth-
and-death processes and Rm(t) is the associated pure birth processes. The process of transmission is the
Poisson process with intensity β (time to next transmission has the exponential density βe−βt, t > 0).
After the intervention (for t ≥ t0), the Poisson process of transmission for m-the group has intensity βm.
We treat this model as purely stochastic despite parts of it can be written it terms of systems of
stochastic differential equations. Despite running pure simulation models taking longer than running
combined models, they are simpler and less prone to certain errors.
The number of infected at time t as the main quantity of interest
To start with, in Figure 1 we consider an uninterrupted run of an epidemic with R0 = 2.5 in a homogeneous
(one-group) population. The starting time of an epidemic is unknown and is even hard to define as the
first transmissions of the virus take random and perhaps long times. We start plotting the curves after
0.5% of the population are infected.
In red colour, in Figure 1 and all plots below we plot values of S(t)/N , the proportion of people
non-infected by time t. In blue, we plot R(t)/N , the proportion of people recovered from the disease
(or dead) and in green we plot our main quantity of interest which is I(t)/N , the proportion of infected
people at time t. The values of R(t) do not play any part in modelling and are plotted for information
only.
The duration of time while a person with a virus is infected is modelled by Erlang distribution with
shape parameter k = 3 and mean 21. The simulations are flexible and we can easily change these values
and plot similar curves with updated data. Despite the full recovery taking slightly longer, 1/σ = 21
days is a good estimation for the period of time when people with severe infection may require intensive
care, ventilator etc. Also, we believe that this is a suitable distribution for the period of time when such
people may die.
From the value I(t), we can estimate the distribution of the number of deaths, at time t, as follows:
first, since on average an infected person is considered as infected for 21 days, we compute I(t)/21. At
each particular day, any person can die with the probability which is typical for the chosen population or
sub-population. If we consider the whole population, then we apply the mortality rate for the population.
However, if I(t) refers to a particular group only, then we should apply the corresponding coefficient for
the group. In any case, the distribution for the number of deaths at time t can be roughly considered as
binomial with parameters I(t) and the probability of ‘success’ rσ, where r is the mortality rate. Different
authors disagree on the values of mortality r for the COVID-19; see, for example, [10]. UK’s experts
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Figure 1: An uninterrupted run of a COVID-19 epidemic in homogeneous conditions
believe r ' 0.009 [3], WHO sets the world-wide mortality rate at 0.034, the authors of [11] believe r is
very small and could be close to 0.001, an Israeli expert D. Yamin sets r = 0.003, see [12].
Example 1. Assume that the epidemic in Birmingham (with population size N ' 1, 086m) was
running uninterrupted according to the scenario depicted in Figure 1. The maximum value of I(t)/N is
' 0.163 giving the maximum expected daily death toll of 0.163 · 1086000 · 0.009/21 ' 75.8 assuming we
use UK experts value r = 0.009.
Although simple to implement, the estimation in Example 1 is likely to be wrong, as it would be for
any heterogeneous city (e.g. London). Critically, as will be discussed in the next section, the maximum
death toll is likely to be significantly lower than the above calculations suggest.
Summarizing, the expected daily mortality curve is simply a suitably scaled version of I(t)/N of
Figure 1. The same is applied to the curves representing expected number of hospital beds and ventilators.
The variability for the number deaths is naturally considerably higher than the variability for the numbers
of required hospital beds and ventilators as the latter ones are correlated in view of the fact that each
person occupies a bed (requires a ventilator) for a few days in a row but dies only once.
Unlike I(t), the number of deaths D(t) at each particular day is (approximately) known and potentially
can be used for estimating the first and second derivatives of I(t)/N and hence the stage of the epidemic.
It is, however, difficult to do for the following reasons: randomness in the values D(t), see above, and,
more importantly, heterogeneity of large sub-populations, see next section.
One of the main targets of decision-makers for dealing with epidemics like COVID-19 can be referred
to as ‘flattening the curve’, where ‘the curve’ is I(t)/N or any of its equivalents and ’flattening’ roughly
means ‘suppressing the maximum’. We shall consider this in the next sections.
3 Spatial heterogeneity of the population and heterogeneity of
epidemic development in different areas
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that heterogeneity of epidemic developments for different
sub-populations has significant effect on ‘flattening the curve’.
Already when this paper was completed, the authors learned about a preprint [13] which uses SIR
modelling to produce somewhat similar conclusions with more specifics for COVID-19 in the UK. However,
SIR modelling using numerous age-classes and many equations for each age-class different across different
parts of the country resulting in an astronomical number of parameters; this makes any sensitivity analysis
to various parameters uncheckable. We believe that a combination of stochastic models like the present
one with standard SIR-based models can help in significantly reducing the number of parameters while
also adding more flexibility to a hybrid model.
Consider the following situation. Assume that we have a population consisting of M sub-populations
(groups) Gm with similar demographic and social characteristics and these sub-populations are subject
to the same epidemic which has started at slightly different times. Let the sizes of sub-population Gm be
Nm with N1 + . . .+Nm = N . In all cases, the curves Im(t)/Nm are shifted in time versions of the curve
I(t)/N of Figure 1.
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In Figures 2 and 3, M = 2 and the second epidemic started 50 days after the first one (incubation
period is set to be 0). In Figures 4 and 5, M = 10 and each next epidemic cycle has started 7 days
after the previous one. In all cases, we evidence the significant ‘flattening the curve’ phenomenon. In
Figures 2–5, the green line is used for the resulting curves I(t)/N . The maximal values of I(t)/N in the
examples depicted in Figures 2–5 are 0.124, 0.136, 0.134 and 0.132, respectively. This is significantly lower
than the value 0.163 for the original curve. In the assumptions of Example 1, these would respectively
lead to the maximum expected number of deaths 57.7, 63.3, 62.9 and 62.7.
Extra heterogeneity of different epidemics caused by the social and demographic heterogeneity of the
sub-populations would further ‘flatten the curve’. The following conclusions are in line with what the
Israeli expert D. Yamin states [12] and agree with the main conclusions of the paper [14] which is rather
critical towards standard epidemiological models.
Figure 2: M = 2, N1 = N2. Figure 3: M = 2, N1 = 3N2
Figure 4: M = 10, Nm =
N
10 (m = 1, . . . , 10) Figure 5: M = 10, N1 =
N
2 , Nm =
N
18 (m > 1)
Conclusions. (a) Isolation of sub-populations at initial stages of an epidemic is very important for
preserving heterogeneity of the epidemic and ‘flattenning the curve’; this flattening can be very signifi-
cant. (b) Epidemiological models based on the assumption of a homogeneous population but applied for
populations consisting of heterogeneous sub-populations may give completely misleading results.
4 An epidemic with intervention
In this section, we assume that we make an intervention to the epidemic by introducing an isolation at
a certain stage. Moreover, we assume that isolation may be different for 2 different groups. We define
a special group G of more vulnerable people consisting, for example, of all people aged 70+. We define
α = n/N , where N is the total population size and n is the size of this special group G.
Let t0 be the moment of time when the isolation occurs. It is natural to define t0 from the condition
S(t0)/N = x, where, for example, x = 0.9. For t < t0, the virus has been transmitted to people uniformly
so that, conditionally a virus is transmitted, the probability that it reaches a person from group G is
α. For t ≥ t0, the virus has been transmitted to people in such a way that, conditionally a virus is
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transmitted, the probability that it reaches a person from G is p = cα with 0 < c ≤ 1. Moreover, at time
t0 the value of R0 may change to R
′
0 in view of self-isolation. The parameters in this model are:
• α = n/N : relative size of the group G;
• x ∈ (0, 1) defines the start of the isolation strategy;
• c = p/α defines the strength of isolation of the group G;
• R0 (initial);
• R′0: the reproductive number after intervention for t ≥ t0; it defines the strength of the overall
isolation.
We have run a large number of scenarios coded using a combination of R and Julia [15]; the code is
provided in Appendix. In Figures 6–11, we illustrate a few of these scenarios. In all these scenarios, we
have chosen R0 = 2.5 and α = 0.2. The results are robust towards values of these parameters (subject to
faster or slower rate of the epidemic in dependence on R0). In Section 5 we use α = 0.132 to illustrate
some specific results; α = 0.2 can be considered either as a generic value or, in the contents of Section 5,
as the relative size of the group of vulnerable people which is larger than the group of people aged 70+.
We would like to emphasise that there is still a lot of uncertainty on who is vulnerable. It is very
possible that the long term effect of the virus might cause many extra morbidities in the coming years
coming from severe cases who recover. It is also possible that the virus will mutate and the new strain
might affect younger populations more than the current strain. These, and many more possibilities, have
a non-negligible probability of occurring, and they have devastating effects. In future models we will try
to address these possibilities.
To estimate the number of COVID cases at a given time t is difficult [4]. This implies that at the time
of making an intervention only very rough guesses about the value of x, which is crucial for the future
development of the epidemic, can be made.
We distinguish different strengths of isolation by values of parameters c and R′0:
c =
 1 no extra separation for people in G0.5 mild extra separation for people in G
0.25 strong extra separation for people in G
R′0 =
 R0 no social distancing requirement for general public1.5 social distancing but no self-isolation requirement for general public
1 self-isolation requirement for general public
The values c = 0.5 and c = 0.25 mean that under the condition that a virus is infecting a new person,
the probabilities that this new person belongs to G are 1/3 and 1/5 respectively.
Measuring the level of compliance in the population and converting this to simple epidemiological
measures c and R′0 is hugely complex problem which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The lines and respective colours in Figures 6–11 are as follows.
• Solid blue line: R(t)/N , the proportion of people recovered from the disease (or dead) in case of no
intervention, as in Figure 1.
• Dashed blue line: R(t)/N in case of intervention.
• Solid black line: RG(t)/n the proportion of people from group G recovered from the disease (or
dead) in case of intervention.
• Solid red line: S(t)/N , the proportion of people non-infected by time t in case of no intervention,
as in Figure 1.
• Solid orange line: SG(t)/n, the proportion of people susceptible to the virus from group G non-
infected by time t in case of intervention.
• Solid green line: I(t)/N , the proportion of infected people at time t with no intervention, as in
Figure 1.
• Dashed green line: I(t)/N , the proportion of infected people at time t with intervention.
• Solid purple line: IG(t)/n, the proportion of infected people from groupG at time t with intervention.
Considerably important, in view of the discussions of the next section, is Figure 6. In this figure, for
the initial data of Figure 1, we strongly separate group G at the time when 10% of the population is
infected. We make no call to the general public for social distancing. In this scenario, the intervention
does not considerably change the proportion of infected in the total population but it significantly ‘flattens
the curve’ for the group G: compare the purple and green lines. The maximum of IG(t)/n is 0.086 which
is 2.5 times lower than 0.216, the maximum of I(t)/N . Note also the fact that the curve IG(t)/n is
rather flat for long time, during the main stage of development of the epidemic. Just after the peak of
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Figure 6: x = 0.9, c = 0.25, R′0 = 2.5
Figure 7: x = 0.9, c = 0.25, R′0 = 2.5, no incubation period
the epidemic in the whole population, IG(t)/n peaks; it is caused by the presence of very large number
of infected people from the general population.
The scenario which led to Figure 6 is important and hence it has been re-run for a few variations of
the model. Figure 7 shows the results of the simulations where we have removed the incubation period.
The maximum of IG(t)/n is now 0.075 which is more than twice lower than 1.63, the maximum of I(t)/N .
Note that in the scenario with no incubation period the whole epidemic is milder as the virus lives longer.
In Figure 8 we use similar scenario as for Figure 6 but we separate group G only mildly at the time
when 10% of the population is infected. We make no call to general public for social distancing. The
curve IG(t)/n is ‘flattened’ for the group G but in a considerably smaller degree than in the case of strong
separation of G.
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the situation with mild and strong separation of people from G comple-
mented with introduction of the social distancing for general public. Interestingly enough, the effect of
social distancing for general public gives less benefit than even mild isolation of people from group G.
Figure 11 illustrates the scenario with no call to the general public for social distancing but with
strong separation of the people from G at at a later stage of epidemic, when 20% of the population is
infected. The effect is similar to the one observed in Figures 6 and 7 except for the fact that the call for
isolating the group G came slightly late.
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Figure 8: x = 0.9, c = 0.5, R′0 = 2.5
Figure 9: x = 0.9, c = 0.5, R′0 = 1.5
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Figure 10: x = 0.9, c = 0.25, R′0 = 1.5
Figure 11: x = 0.8, c = 0.25, R′0 = 2.5
Conclusion. By considering a number of scenarios we have observed an extreme sensitivity of the
negative consequences of the epidemic to the degree of separation of vulnerable people. Sensitivity to the
parameter measuring the degree of self-isolation for the whole population is less apparent although it is
much costlier.
This conclusion is very much in line with recommendations of leading German epidemiologists [16].
5 Consequences for the mortality and impact on NHS
Results of the type presented in Figures 6–11 can be translated into the language of the expected number
of death and expected number of beds required. To do this we extend the observations we made at the
end of Section 2 concerning translation of the curve I(t)/N into the curves for the expected number of
death ED(t) and expected number of hospital beds in the UK. We use the common split of the UK
population into following age groups:
G1 = [0, 19], G2 = [20, 29], G3 = [30, 39], G4 = [40, 49],
G5 = [50, 59], G6 = [60, 69], G7 = [70, 79], G8 = [80,∞)
and corresponding numbers Nm (m = 1, . . . , 8; in millions) taken from [17]
[15.58, 8.71, 8.83, 8.50, 8.96, 7.07, 5.49, 3.27] with N = 66.41
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The death probabilities pm are given from Table 1 in [3] and replicated many times by the BBC and
other news agencies are:
[0.00003, 0.0003, 0.0008, 0.0015, 0.006, 0.022, 0.051, 0.093] .
Unfortunately, these numbers do not match the other key number given in [3]: the UK average mortality
rate which is estimated to be about 0.9%. As we feel the value of the UK average mortality rate is more
important, we have multiplied all probabilities above by 0.732 to get the average mortality rate to be
0.9%.
Defining the group G as a union of groups G7 and G8, we have n = 5.49 + 3.27 = 8.76m and
α = 8.76/66.41 ' 0.132. We then compute the mortality rate in the group G and for the rest of
population by
rG =
N7p7 +N8p8
n
' 0.049; rother = N1p1 + . . .+N6p6
N − n ' 0.0030.
For estimating the average number of death in the group G and for the rest of population we can the
use the formulas
EDG(t) = rGσIG(t) and EDother(t) = rotherσ(I(t)− IG(t))
respectively. The average numbers of hospital beds required for two different groups are proportional to
these numbers.
We have run a series of scenarios for an UK epidemic without taking into account spatial and social
heterogeneity of the society assuming that we would have separated (mildly and strongly) the group G
of 70+ people at the time t0 when 10% of the population were infected with no call to general public for
social distancing. We marked t0 as March 23, 2020.
The two scenarios (with c = 0.5 and c = 0.25) we have used for illustrating this technique are different
from the scenarios used for plotting Figures 6 and 7 only by the value of α. For Figures 6 and 7, we have
chosen α = 0.2 but for the group G of 70+ old people in the UK we have α = 0.13.
In Figures 12 and 13 we plot (using the same colours as in Figures 6 and 7) the following curves:
I(t)/N (solid green, no intervention on March 23), I(t)/N (dashed green, intervention on March 23) and
IG(t)/n (purple, intervention on March 23).
In Figures 14 and 15 we plot the curves for the estimated average number of deaths: ED(t) (solid
green, no intervention on March 23), EDG(t) (purple, intervention on March 23), EDother(t) (dashed
green, intervention on March 23) and combined E[DG(t) +Dother(t)] (black, intervention on March 23).
We can deduce from Figure 15 (taking into account the extra factor of hospital beds availability) that
strong separation of 70+ old people alone would have reduced the expected number of death by at least
the factor of 2. Another feature of the scenario with c = 0.25 is a roughly 50/50 split between the number
of deaths in the 70+ and 70− groups.
The y-axis in Figures 14 and 15, after multiplication by 140, can be roughly interpreted as hundreds
in the London epidemic assuming R0 = 2.5, x = 0.9 on March 23 and homogeneity of the epidemic (as
there is about 9m people in London out of 64.1m). As mentioned in Section 3, deaths numbers in other
regions of the UK should be expected to be lower.
Figure 12: c = 0.5 Figure 13: c = 0.25
We then have run through the scenarios with partial lockdown on March 23 reducing R0 = 2.5 to
R′0 = 1 and with a return, 30 days later, to R0 = 2.5 with c = 0.5 and c = 0.25. Results are plotted in
Figures 16-19. The style of Figure is exactly the same as for Figures 12-15. If the value x (proportion of
non-infected people on March 23) happens to be larger than 0.9 then the second wave of epidemic should
be expected to be (perhaps, considerably) larger. If x < 0.9 then the second wave will be less pronounced.
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Figure 14: c = 0.5 Figure 15: c = 0.25
All these figures are given for illustration only without any claim on accurate predictions as there is
an uncertainty of the outputs towards the choice of several parameters describing the virus characteristics
but the sensitivity of the model towards the choice of these parameters is not yet adequately assessed.
Figures 20-21 illustrate sensitivity of the scenario of Figures 16-17 with respect to the choice of k, the
shape parameter of the Erlang distribution defined in Section 2. In these figures, we plot 100 trajectories
similar to the trajectories of Figures 16-17 with the values of k taken at random in the interval [2, 4].
Figure 16: c = 0.5 Figure 17: c = 0.25
Figure 18: c = 0.5 Figure 19: c = 0.25
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Figure 20: c = 0.5, k ∈ [2, 4] Figure 21: c = 0.25, k ∈ [2, 4]
Conclusion. The outputs of the model developed above can be translated into the language of the
expected number of death due to the epidemic. This language amplifies the findings of the previous section
stating that isolation of a relatively small percentage of population may hugely reduce the death toll of the
epidemic.
Some of the next steps and open problems
• Run many different scenarios to get better understanding of the current situation with the epidemic
and what can be done to effectively control it.
• Continue calibrating the model against existing epidemiological models and new data as it emerges.
• By using methods of stochastic global optimization [18, 19], teach the model to learn from the data
emerging daily, for adapting values of parameters describing the virus and hence the course of the
epidemic.
• Incorporate into the model algorithms for quickest on-line detection of changes [20, 21] to learn
about temporal and spatial heterogeneity of the development of the epidemic.
• Understanding the reproductive number R0 in dependence on the population density in local areas
and hence the mixing distribution for R0 needed to combine sub-populations.
• Understanding R0 and other virus parameters as random variables due to mutations.
• Understanding the risk as a function depending on different factors such as age and social groups.
• Use of OR models for studying NHS capacity issues under different scenarios and correlated to the
percentage of health providers getting infected by the virus.
• Properly quantify uncertainty for model predictions.
• Full-scale sensitivity analysis to different parameters.
• With better understanding of the role of parameters, formulate inverse problems like finding the
stage of an epidemic by its early development.
• Use game theory [22] to produce tools for optimal decision making with respect to slowing down
the process of epidemic by enforcing spatial isolation and isolation of different sub-populations.
• Develop a more sophisticated model combining stochastic differential calculus [23], fractional dif-
fusion [24] and elements of direct simulation (the models of fractional diffusion will be used to
understand the effects of slowing down of the epidemic).
• Understand and quantify the differences in epidemic developments across different countries such
as UK, USA, Italy and Spain.
• Studying long-term effects of coronovirus and future mortality from Covid-19.
• Studying mortality from other diseases due to the capacity/fragility of the health system during the
epidemic.
• Modelling epidemic control strategies based on testing, tracing and isolation.
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Appendix: Julia/R code used for computing the scenarios of Sec-
tion 4
1 #### Main script with R and Julia ####
2
3 ## Running code will require installation of Julia
4 ## install.packages (" JuliaCall ")
5 library(’JuliaCall ’)
6 ## In the below , specify where Julia is located
7 julia <- julia_setup(JULIA_HOME= "/ Applications/Julia -1.4. app/Contents/Resources
/julia/bin")
8 ## Install required packages in Julia and import into R
9 julia_library (" Random ")
10 julia_library (" Distributions ")
11
12 ## Main simulation
13
14 ## Set total time to run simulation
15 Total_time =250
16
17 ## Below is the main procedure. Refer to paper for description of what
parameters are.
18
19 julia_command (" function Main_procedure(Time ,R,R_prime ,N,c,quantile ,alpha ,sigma)
20 Time=Int(Time)
21 N=Int(N)
22
23 ## Set parameters for study
24 beta = R*sigma ## Transmission coefficient
25 k=3 ## parameter for Erlang Distribution
26 alpha_prime = c*alpha ## New alpha
27 beta1 =R_prime*sigma ## New transmission coefficient if R0
changes
28 Infectious_parameter =1/7 ## Average of incubation period
29
30 ## indexes of columns in the matrix ’Population ’
31 person =1
32 age=2
33 Group =3
34 Susceptible =4
35 Infected =5
36 Recovered =6
37 Time_til_infected =7
38 time_of_next_inf =8
39 time_of_recovery =9
40 previous_infection =10
41
42 ## Create initial population
43
44 G1_split = Int(N*(1-alpha)) ## Number of people in first group
45 G2_split = N-G1_split ## Number of people in second group
46
47 Population =zeros(Int32 ,N,10)
48 Population [:,person ]=[1:N;]
49 Population [:, Susceptible ].=1
50 Population [1: G1_split ,Group ].=1
51 Population[G1_split +1:N,Group ].=2
52
53 Num_of_ran = Int(round(N*0.005))
54 ran=randperm(N)[1: Num_of_ran]
55 qq=(1: Num_of_ran)/( Num_of_ran +1)
56 temp1=floor .( cquantile .( Exponential (1/ Infectious_parameter), qq))[
randperm(Num_of_ran)]
57 temp1[temp1 .==0].=1
58 Population[ran ,Time_til_infected ]= temp1 ## Time they will become
infected and can pass on virus
59 #Population[ran ,] $Infected =0
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60 Population[ran ,Susceptible ].=1
61 temp = floor .( cquantile .( Exponential (1/ beta), qq))[randperm(
Num_of_ran)]
62 temp[temp .==0].=1
63 Population[ran ,time_of_next_inf] = Population[ran ,
Time_til_infected] + temp ## Time they pass on virus to
someone
64 temp2 = floor.( cquantile .( Gamma(k,1/(k*sigma)), qq))[randperm(
Num_of_ran)]
65 Population[ran ,time_of_recovery] = Population[ran ,
Time_til_infected] + temp2 # Time this person recovers when
infected
66
67
68
69 ## Create variables for tracking
70
71 Susceptible_track = zeros(Time) ## vector created to
track those susceptible in whole population
72 Infected_track = zeros(Time) ## vector created to
track those infected in whole population
73 Recovered_track = zeros(Time) ## vector created to
track those recovered in whole population
74 Second_group_track = zeros(Time) ## vector created to
track those recovered in vulnerable population
75 Second_group_track_susc = zeros(Time) ## vector created to
track those susceptible in vulnerable population
76 Second_group_track_Inf = zeros(Time) ## vector created to
track those infected in vulnerable population
77
78 ## Begin simulation
79
80 time_to_start_isolation=Time
81 for t in 1:Time
82 ## Isolation code. Only initialise isolation when proportion of
suceptible people = quantile
83
84 if (sum(Population [:, Susceptible ])/N < quantile) && (t<
time_to_start_isolation)
85 time_to_start_isolation=t
86 end
87
88 ## Index the current people who have the chance to infect others.
89
90 Current = Population [( Population [:, Time_til_infected ].<t) .& (
Population [:, Time_til_infected ].>Int(0)) .& (Population [:,
Recovered ].== Int(0)) ,1]
91
92 for i in Current
93 Population[i,Infected] = 1 ## Person now becomes
infected
94 Population[i,Susceptible] = 0 ## Remove susceptible
flag
95 Population[i,previous_infection] = 1 ## Initialise previous
infection flag
96
97 ## If it is time to infect and not time to recover proceed
98
99 if (Population[i,time_of_next_inf ]==t & t<Population[i,
time_of_recovery] )
100
101 if ( Population[i,Group ]==1 )
102
103 ## Before isolation. We take alpha and not alpha prime
104 if (t<time_to_start_isolation)
105 X = ifelse(rand()<alpha ,2,1) ## Sample from which group to
infect
106 ## Randomly select one person from that group
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107 Y = Int(ifelse(X==1,ceil(G1_split*rand()),G1_split+ceil(G2_split*
rand())))
108 ## Check if person has virus previously. Otherwise give virus
109 if ( Population[Y,previous_infection ]==0 & Population[Y,
Time_til_infected ]==0 )
110 temp = floor(rand(Exponential (1/ beta)))
111 Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]= t+ floor(rand(Exponential (1/
Infectious_parameter)))
112 Population[Y,time_of_next_inf] = Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]+
ifelse(temp==0,1,temp)
113 Population[Y,time_of_recovery] = Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]+
floor(rand(Gamma(k,1/(k*sigma))))
114 end
115 ## isolation initialised. We take alpha prime here
116 else
117 X = ifelse(rand()<alpha_prime ,2,1) ## Sample from which group to
infect
118 ## Randomly select one person from that group
119 Y = Int(ifelse(X==1,ceil(G1_split*rand()),G1_split+ceil(G2_split*
rand())))
120 ## Check if person has virus previously. Otherwise give virus
121 if ( Population[Y,previous_infection ]==0& Population[Y,
Time_til_infected ]==0 )
122 temp = floor(rand(Exponential (1/ beta1)))
123 Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]= t+ floor(rand(Exponential (1/
Infectious_parameter)))
124 Population[Y,time_of_next_inf] = Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]+
ifelse(temp==0,1,temp)
125 Population[Y,time_of_recovery] = Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]+
floor(rand(Gamma(k,1/(k*sigma))))
126 end
127 end
128
129
130 ## Repeat the same above for Group 1 but for Group 2 (Vulnerable
group)
131
132 elseif ( Population[i,Group ]==2 )
133
134 if (t<time_to_start_isolation)
135 X = ifelse(rand()<alpha ,2,1)
136 Y = Int(ifelse(X==1,ceil(G1_split*rand()),G1_split+ceil(G2_split*
rand())))
137 if ( Population[Y,previous_infection ]==0& Population[Y,
Time_til_infected ]==0 )
138 temp = floor(rand(Exponential (1/ beta)))
139 Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]= t+ floor(rand(Exponential (1/
Infectious_parameter)))
140 Population[Y,time_of_next_inf] = Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]+
ifelse(temp==0,1,temp)
141 Population[Y,time_of_recovery] = Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]+
floor(rand(Gamma(k,1/(k*sigma))))
142 end
143 else
144 X = ifelse(rand()<alpha_prime ,2,1)
145 Y = Int(ifelse(X==1,ceil(G1_split*rand()),G1_split+ceil(G2_split*
rand())))
146 if ( Population[Y,previous_infection ]==0 & Population[Y,
Time_til_infected ]==0 )
147 temp = floor(rand(Exponential (1/ beta1)))
148 Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]= t+ floor(rand(Exponential (1/
Infectious_parameter)))
149 Population[Y,time_of_next_inf] = Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]+
ifelse(temp==0,1,temp)
150 Population[Y,time_of_recovery] = Population[Y,Time_til_infected ]+
floor(rand(Gamma(k,1/(k*sigma))))
151 end
152 end
15
153 end
154
155
156 ## If it is not time for the person infected to recover , find next
time the person will transmit
157 if (t<time_to_start_isolation)
158 temp = floor(rand(Exponential (1/ beta)))
159 Population[i,time_of_next_inf ]= Population[i,time_of_next_inf ]+
ifelse(temp==0,1,temp)
160 else
161 temp = floor(rand(Exponential (1/ beta1)))
162 Population[i,time_of_next_inf ]= Population[i,time_of_next_inf ]+
ifelse(temp==0,1,temp)
163
164 end
165
166 ## If it is time to recover , set recovery flag =1 and remove
infected flag.
167
168 elseif ( Population[i,time_of_recovery]<t )
169 Population[i,Recovered ]=1
170 Population[i,Infected ]=0
171 end
172 end # for i in Current
173
174 ## Update tracking variables
175
176 index = t
177
178 Susceptible_track[index] = sum(Population [:, Susceptible ])/N
## Keep track of susceptible rate
179 Recovered_track[index] = sum(Population [:, Recovered ])/N
## Keep track of recovered rate
180 Infected_track[index] = sum(Population [:,Infected ])/N
## Keep track of infected rate
181 Second_group_track[index] = sum(Population[G1_split +1:N,Recovered
])/G2_split ## Keep track of recovered rate for vulnerable
182 Second_group_track_susc[index] = sum(Population[G1_split +1:N,
Susceptible ])/G2_split ## Keep track of susceptible rate for
vulnerable
183 Second_group_track_Inf[index] = sum(Population[G1_split +1:N,
Infected ])/G2_split ## Keep track of Infected rate for
vulnerable
184
185 #global t=t+1
186 end # for t
187
188 Output = zeros(Time ,8)
189 Output [:,1] = Susceptible_track
190 Output [:,2] = Recovered_track
191 Output [:,3] = Infected_track
192 Output [:,4] = Second_group_track
193 Output [:,5] = Second_group_track_susc
194 Output [:,6] = Second_group_track_Inf
195 Output [:,7] .= time_to_start_isolation
196 Output
197 end")
198
199 # Set the parameters for the study
200 R=2.5
201 R_prime =2.5
202 N=1000000
203 c=1
204 quantile =0.8
205 alpha =0.2
206 sigma =1/21
207
208 ########################
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209 Scenario_1 = julia_call (" Main_procedure",Total_time ,R,R_prime ,N,c,quantile ,
alpha ,sigma)
210 ## Change c for different scenarios
211 c=0.25
212 Scenario_2 = julia_call (" Main_procedure",Total_time ,R,R_prime ,N,c,quantile ,
alpha ,sigma)
213 ########################
214 Scenario_1=t(Scenario_1)
215 Scenario_2=t(Scenario_2)
216
217 ## Plots for scenario 1
218 plot(seq(0,Total_time -1,1),Scenario_1 [1,],type=’l’,col=’red ’,ylim=c(0,1),lwd=3,
lty=1,main=’’,xlab=’Days ’,ylab=’’,cex.axis=2,cex.lab=2,cex.main =1.5)
219 lines(seq(0,Total_time -1,1),Scenario_1 [2,],type=’l’,col=’blue ’,lwd=3 ,lty=1 )
220 lines(seq(0,Total_time -1,1),Scenario_1 [3,],type=’l’,col=’green ’,lwd=3 ,lty=1 )
221 abline(v= Scenario_1 [7,],lwd =2)
222
223 ## Lines for scenario 2
224 lines(seq(0,Total_time -1,1),Scenario_2 [1,],type=’l’,col=’red ’,ylim=c(0,1),lwd=3,
lty=2,main=’’,xlab=’Days ’,ylab=’’,cex.axis=2,cex.lab=2,cex.main =1.5)
225 lines(seq(0,Total_time -1,1),Scenario_2 [2,],type=’l’,col=’blue ’,lwd=3,lty=2)
226 lines(seq(0,Total_time -1,1),Scenario_2 [3,],type=’l’,col=’green ’,lwd=3,lty=2)
227 lines(seq(0,Total_time -1,1),Scenario_2 [4,],type=’l’,col=’black ’,lwd=3,lty=1 )
228 lines(seq(0,Total_time -1,1),Scenario_2 [5,],type=’l’,col=’orange ’,lwd=3,lty=1 )
229 lines(seq(0,Total_time -1,1),Scenario_2 [6,],type=’l’,col=’purple ’,lwd=3,lty=1 )
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